Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome back to campus. I'm Michael Barr. I'm the Joan and Stanford Weil dean of the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan. I’m delighted to welcome you to all of this, the first event of a series of distinguished speakers to mark the launch Weiser Diplomacy Center. I want to start by thanking regent Ron Weiser and Mrs. Eileen Weiser who are with us right here today for their generous Donation to establish the Weiser Diplomacy Center. Ron was U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia and Eileen served alongside him in their time, and they are both passionately committed to the importance of diplomacy and to the men and women to serve our country abroad. They are wonderful friends, and we are grateful for their strong support of the Ford School and the University of Michigan more broadly. So let me begin, please let me ask you to join me in thanking Ron and Eileen Weiser. [Applause] This Weiss diplomacy center serves as a unique hub for academic and practical training and policy dialogue, preparing our students to become the nation's next foreign policy leaders, diplomats and experts in foreign affairs. As a meeting point for practitioners, men and women whose careers span the apex of important policy and academics, the WDC provides a bridge between University of Michigan and the foreign policy community. With Ron and Eileen's help, the WDC can become the country's leading institutions for International affairs. The previously the mission of the WDC has three parts. First, hands-on practical training and mentor ship for rising foreign policy professionals who have access to, Sr. diplomats serving as professor of international diplomacy and visiting professors here at the Ford school. Second, oversee study and policy engagement with internships and engagement opportunities that span the globe. This summer students went to the forgs an international migration in Jenn eve, a the Asia. The U.S. embassy in Bogota and a leaned development organization in India,elingy with the DWDC also funds shorter student initiatives over spring break for example last year four students went to Guatemala to work with a leaned human rights group on forensic anthropology. community on a wide ray of topics Frank peace and security to development document to humility rights and the environment. This line-up this fall exposes our students tie breadth of experience and policy perspective including today's speaker Steve Biegun as well as Steve hadley, Samantha power, Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Rodham Clinton. As well as leading former ambassadors from many eras and countries. You will note that this launch series also supports our conversations across difference initiative. As you well know, these are challenging times in our nation with fractious political discourse, gridlock and partisanship and be an increasing lack of trust in institutions everywhere. It is in moments like this when the craft of diplomacy is even more essential, and when talking and listening across political and other differences is really essential. We are thus honored to bring to the campus a wealth of expertise this fall and we could not be more delighted to begin with the insights of today's speaker U.S. special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun. I'm going to turn over the podium now to faculty director of Weirs diplomacy center Ford school faculty member John who will introduce our speaker. John. [Applause] Thank you, Michael, and welcome to all of you. It's very much my honor to introduce Steve Biegun. He's a Michigan man and he embodies leader qualities and the commitment to serve that we aim to foster at the new Weiser diplomacy center. Since his undergraduate studs here atum in Russian and political science he's pane a leader in the practice of a attorney affairs through several different channels on Capitol Hill, through the executive branch and business in the non-profit sector. Shortly after the cold war at a critical junk commuter in Russia he what is the In country director in Moscow for the International Republican Institute, a leading non-profit organization promoting freedom and democracy abroad. He has held senior positions in the house foreign relations committees as well as been chief of staff to the Senate foreign relations committee and national security adviser to former Senate majority leader Bill Frist. In those capacities he's worked on a wide array of issues including the foreign aid budget, trade agreements with various partners, defense, intelligence, European affairs and more. During the George W. Bush administration he served as executive secretary at the national security council. This is essentially the NF treatment chief operating soar ppts it's a crucial roll in creating policies and effective interagency process, exactly the kind of of practical foreign policy knowledge that we're trying to cultivate and that our students are learning in the Ford school's new course on the NFC this term. Steve Biegun has extensive leadership experience in the private center having sender as a VP at international affairs at Ford Motor Company overseeing Ford's interanswers around the world. He returned to government I year ago as U.S. special representative for North Korea, ab pointed shortly after the June 2018 Singapore summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The summit was a bold and controversial step, one of the signature foreign policy initiatives of the trump administration. The president and secretary of state Pompeo saw somebody who had the diplomat skills to capitalize on the political opening and drive progress toward the very difficult issue of North Korean denuclearization as well as related challenges in the relationship. The fact that they chose Steve Biegun for that role testifies to the strength of both his diplomatic skills and his reputation. Over the past year he's led U.S. policy toward the DPRK, that's the democratic people's republic of Korea on North Korea, and spearhead U.S. negotiations with okay. Yong and engagement with reasonable explies partners toward those pames we're privileged to be able to hear from Steve Biegun today about the challenges and the opportunities and the reply diplomacy undergoing noirks, and we're also grateful for co-sponsorship of this lecture by our friends and colleagues at the name center for Korean stud it's a UM. Before he begins we'll have a time toward the end of the session for audience questions. Please write your questions on the note cards that our staff will provide and collect. Ford school students Ryan van we and Zachary will present the questions with our own ambassador. Now on behalf of the Ford center and the name center give Steve Biegun a warm weerchl welcome. [Applause] -- Wolfe even welcome. [Applause] . Thank you, Dean Barr. Thank you, John, for that kind introduction. And thank you all for inviting he here today. I had a long day already here on campus. I had an opportunity earlier today to meet with a group of students, started the program at the Ford school called we listen. It's geared to have civil discussion, thoughtful discussion and to engage each other on public policy issues. It's a truly inspirational group. Student-driven. And if you don't know about it, I'd recommend you look up their website. If you're a student here, I'd recommend you think about it. They're doing great work for the university. I also had a chance to have lunch today with a group students from the Ford school, an incredibly impressive bunch. Many of them already well into successful careers. And it was a real privilege and honor to spend this time this morning with so many we never students. Wolverine. I can't tell you what a great pleasure it is to be on the campus of the University of Michigan where for me it all began so many years ago. Tomorrow marks exactly there go years since I first sat down in a lecture hall here at the University of Michigan. Having left a small Michigan town where I grew up, I stepped onto this campus to begin an educational journey that has served me my entire career. It opened the world to me and, more importantly, it opened me to the world. I'm grateful for the incredible teachers, visiting instructors, guest speakers, the teachings, the rallies, the protests and the vibrant, eclectic, diverse and irrepressible student body that the University of Michigan has always attracted. I've learned to think in ways that have benefited me throughout my career. It's great to be home. Go blue. [Applause] I'd like to add my thanks to the University of Michigan's Ford school public policy and the Nam center for Korean studies for hosting me this afternoon, and it's an honor to be the inaugural speaker of the Weiser diplomacy center's speaker series. Ron Weiser has for many years been a friend, and for a few years even a colleague in government. I know firsthand of his and his wife Eileen's devotion to public service and to the advancement of American interests and ideals around the world. This new diplomacy center is a fitting embodiment of that devotion. Thank you, Ron. [Applause] In the three decades since I left Ann Arbor I have had the opportunity to work on many challenging and interesting issues in government and the private sector. But none that approaches the consequences of the issue that I'll speak on today as the United States special representative for North Korea. Prior to taking this job, I wasn't really looking to return to government. In fact, I was quite happy in a job I loved at wunt great American auto -- one of the great American auto companies, Ford Motor Company located just up the road. It was there that my grandfather and his father before him made their livings, and it was a great place to work. But as is the case with Ron Weiser and with so many other graduates of this great university who, over the decade, have answered the call of public service, last year I accepted the challenge of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to take up and carry forward a remarkable diplomatic opportunity, an opportunity created by President Trump In June of 2018, the decision of the president to meet at a summit in Singapore with chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea was truly momentous. At the con dilution first-ever meeting between the leaders of our you two countries, they shed a simple strayed forward statement outlining a plan to change the course of events on the Korean peninsula through the transformation of relations through the establishment of a permanent peace and the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. And while there's still much work ahead of us, if we are to fulfill those commitments, the this fact of bold leadership and the simple roadmap it produced may well prove to be the key to unlocking the puzzle of the Korean Peninsula that has bedeviled the world since the end of World War II. Since that historic commit meeting in Singapore, the president has maintained a strong and focused deployment search for a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. He refuses to accept the fact that 66 years after fighting ended in the careen war we have yet to find a successful path to transforming relations and establishing a permanent peace. But the president has also been clear that doing so will require the daunting task of eliminating the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean panes law. The president has directed the starter state, myself and the entire U.S. national security team to spare no effort in our negotiations to fulfill the commitments that the two leaders made at Singapore. We are aware that this diplomatic opening is fragile. We fully understand the consequences if did I diplomacy fails, and we are clear-eyed about the dangerous reality of ongoing development by North Korea of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to the region and to the world. This is in defines of international norms. It is in violation of United Nations security council resolutions. And it is in contravention of Muppet promises made by North Korea to never possess such weapons. For to us make progress towards peace and to take major steps towards transforming our relationship, North Korea must be willing to fulfill its commitment to achieve complete denourishingization. North Korea will never be able to realize its full economic potential or enjoy true economic security and stability if it clings to weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the world will not accept that. And we and other countries in the region need to understand that the outcome of this diplomatic process will have ramifications well beyond the Korean peninsula. Last year, after taking on this assignment, I had the rare and special opportunity to sit down with former Secretary of State Henry kissinger to discuss the way forward. As he shared his observations and thoughtful advice, one comment made a particularly deep impression upon me. Dr. Kissinger noted that we were charged today with working toward the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons, but, he said, if this effort fails, we will be working tomorrow on an Asia wide nuclear proliferation challenge. It does not require a leap of logic to understand what Dr. Kingser was predicting. A North Korea that retains the ability to threaten its neighbors with neecialg weapons risks breaking the international noamples non-proliferation built over 50 years. While a number of countries and economies in Asia have the scientific wherewithal and the technical capacity to develop nuclear weans they have made the judgment that po sense such weapons creates more risk for their security and for their people. Allies such as Japan and South Korea have fore sworn nuclear weapons programs in part because they trust the protection of extended deterrence has included in their alliance relationships with the United States of America. But how long will that conviction hold? If such weapons air mere short range ballistic missile night away from their own territory? At what point will voices in South Korea and Japan and elsewhere in Asia begin to ask if they need tro consider their own nuclear capabilities? And what will this mean for a region whose prosperity and growth has been so inex entribly tied to long-term stability and peace. It is very much in the interests of the United States of America and every other nation in the region to avoid this eventuality. If we are to escape an outcome that will press nations in the region to consider new and more dangerous strategic choices, we must work together as allies and partners in east Asia to achieve the vision that was laid out at the sing Singapore summit. As always, there are consequences for failure. And I fear Dr. Kissinger is correct, that if the international community fails in the undertaking, in this undertaking, North Korea will not be the last nuclear ceaps state in nuclear weapons state in Asia. At this moment to achieve further progress the most important step we can take is for the United States and North Korea to work together, to overcome the policies and demonstrations of hostility that compromise the simple ability of our diplomats to talk and to sustain the rhythm of negotiations. If we are to succeed, North Korea must set aside its search for obstacles to negotiations and instead seek the opportunities for engagement while that opportunity lasts. We have made clear to North Korea we are prepared to engage as soon as we hear from them. We are ready, but we cannot do this by ourselves. Between the United States and North Korea there has been too little communication, too much room for missal accumulation and misunderstanding, and almost no room at all for error. Through direct engagement we must create space and momentum for diplomacy. We must set in motion anens intensive set of set of negotiations and only if we do that will we able to fulfill the our or piece. One we begin intensive negotiations we can have action that both sides can take to create more and better choices for our leaders to consider. Following the outline of the joint statement issued last year by President Trump and chairman Kim at the Singapore summit, we can construct a set of actions that are undertaken to elevate relations from a place of hostility and distrust toward an agreed and state that fulfills the vision of our two leaders, provided that there is a clear commitment to fulfill all the requirements of the agreements made between the two leaders. Now, either the United States -- neither the United States nor Korea has to accept all the risk of moving forward, and there are immediate actions that we can take if negotiations make progress. Judging by the talks President Trump has had with chairman Kim and those that our team has had over the past year with our North Korean counterparts, it is clear that both siding quickly agree to significant actions that will declare to our respective peoples and to the world that the United States-North Korea relations have taken an irreversible turn away from convict. Actions, much more than any words, can infuse this diplomatic moment with more energy. the Korean peninsula and the Dorothy orthodox is and necessities of at at the deternses to which they gief rise make a peaceful-U.S. North Korea's relationship hard to imagine, hard to imagine in the way our current strategic and economic relationship with Vietnam was hard to imagine a mere 20 years ago, hard in the way that alliances with Germany and Japan were unthinkable in the waning days of World War II, hard in the way the e unification of Jeremy and a Europe whole and free were difficult to imagine even as the Berlin wall was falling. There have been prior irrelevant it negotiations with North Korea over the past 25 years, to slow or reverse the development weapons of mass destruction but none of have yet succeed in overcoming the legacy of a brutal war and the decades of hostility that followed. Of course we are mindful that there is no guarantee that our current diplomatic efforts will succeed where others have failed, but with the president's direction and strong support, we are committed to try through did diplomacy to do more, not pleps over the past year we've been able to sustain political space and momentum at home with bipartisan agreement that diplomacy remains the best choice. Our team has invested significant time and effort in consultations with Congress, and we continue to draw support from both sides of the aisle to continue to test this opportunity. Ion our borders, policies on denuclearization of North Korea stand on eye firm foundation of international support. Guided by a series of resolutions, unanimously supported in the United Nations security council and actively supported by allies and partners in Asia, Europe and around the world. We are fully committed to bring an end to the vestiges of hostile relations to the Korean peninsula to follow the path of security for north and South Korea answered and to build the trust that is the necessary foundation for a lasting peace. And through this, achieve the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery on the Korean peninsula. And if we are successful, there is so much potential for opportunity ahead of us. Our two countries in the Indo Pacific region as a whole would greatly benefit from enhanced connectivity through the Korean peninsula. More open sea lands and overflights in and around the peninsula, combined with high-quality infrastructure investment in North Korea would diversify and shorten transport routes, open new export markets for North Korean goods, and open up vast additional areas for economic development in North Korea and in neighboring countries. Energy flows in and out of North Korea would lift the North Korean economy in new diversified trading relationships would improve living standards throughout the peninsula and the region. In terms of security, lowered tensions will mean that our military forces will no longer need to stand and train perpetually ready to fight a war. They could instead serve and cooperate to build a foundation to support a lasting peace. And if we can forge a sustainable peace, forge the modalities of cooperation, we will reap the mutual rewards that will spring from Frank discussions and many other issues that divided the United States and North Korea over all these many years. This is President Trump's vision and it is a vision he is confident that Chairman Kim shares. When the president took as of more than two years ago, North Korea represented the most urgent national security priority waiting on his desk. What has moved the Korean peninsula off of a path toward conflict and onto a path of peace has been the bold leadership of President Trump and Chairman Kim. Whereas the experts cownsd incrementalism, the president understood that the situation called for a clear break with the past. We needed to do something different, something dramatic to head off conflict. The president's decision to hole two summits and to seek agreement at the highest levels with the North Koreans was not to say the least the conventional wisdom of the Washington, DC, foreign policy establishment. The decision two months ago to propose ap impromptu meeting with chairman Kim had no guarantee of success, in fact, Chairman Kim could have rejected the last-minute invitation out of hand. But he didn't. And as a result of each of these engagements between our two leaders, the door to diplomacy has been held open a little longer. Over the course of this past year, the president has made clear to North Korea and to the world that he has made this choice for the United States. He has given our negotiating team clear instructions to deliver on his deep commitment to transforming U.S.-North Korean relations through diplomacy, as agreed with chairman Kim at Singapore, and he has said he is confident that Chairman Kim will not sploint disappoint him. Bringing lasting piece to the Korean Peninsula will ultimately only succeed with the leadership of President Trump and chairman kill. Both must be able to see opportunity where others inside their respective systems do not. Opportunity that could blossom from the successful transformation of our relations, the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. To succeed, both must choose this course and follow through with actions that will seize that opportunity. The president is fully committed to making significant progress toward these goals in the year ahead and should Chairman Kim share in President Trump's commitment to advance the ideas I have laid out today, he will find our team is ready to turn this vision into reality. Thank you. [Applause] Okay. To start off with our question-and-answer session, I'm going to have a few questions for Mr. Being be UN to give Ryan and Zack a bit of time to review some questions that you have submitted from the audience and then we'll open up the rest of the session to hear your queries. If I may, I'd like to start with a pair of questions, one that's more a medium term question and one that's more a immediate short-term question. A medium term question is this. For many years the United States' policy and expressed goal of negotiations with North Korea has been to achieve a complete verifiable and not easily reversible denuclearization of the DPRK. And surely Kim Jong-un and other leaders in North Korea look at the cases of Iraq and Libya and think of the weapons, the nuclear weapons program as both an extremely important bargaining chip with the international community and some form of insurance for a deeply disfavored dictatorship. And so I'm sure you agree that even if the goal is realistic websites a very challenging one to achieve. The question is what do you see as the key conditions under which this North Korean regime would give consideration to the types of serious and potentially even irreversible reverse alsz als of their nuclear program that the United States is demanding? Thank you, John, and certainly something that we've spent a lot of time thinking about. One of the -- there are several things that are different about this diplomatic initiative than how we have engaged North Korea in the past, but one area in particular that addresses the underlying question you asked is that we're seeing do a lot more than issue weaches mass destruction. The Singapore statement that I referred to in my remarks actually has two parts or four pillars as we refer to them. The first is that the two leaders committed to transform the relations between our two countries. The second is that the two leaders committed to the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. I imagine not everyone here is an expert on the history of Korean peninsula, but it's worth pointing out that the war when it ended in 1953 ended in an armistice. Technically that war has not been concluded with a treaty. Establishing a permanent peace regime is going to be critical to changing the politics. The two agreement they made was the Korean peninsula. The last, the fourth pillar which we don't talk about as much is a humanitarian initiative. It's to recover the remains of the U.S. soldiers and Marines who fell during the Korean war, invest in other countries to recover and account for their losses in the Korean war, and we've expanded it also in our discussions with the North Koreans to include finding ways for Koreans inside and outside North Korea to reunify as families to meet each other after a period of long division. It is challenging. As I said in my remarks, we're trying to overcome 70 years of hostility on the Korean peninsula. That's a long time. One of the anecdotes that was mention today mentioned to me that has really Meads me was that North Korea has existed longer than the Soviet Union existed. The Soviet Union is now the historical blink of an eye. North Korea-U.S. relations for seven years. We have a way find more than just weapons of mass destruction issue. We have to change the incentives. And by changing the trajectory of our policies, it's our hope that we can likewise change the trajectory of theirs. North Korea doesn't need nuclear weapons. The United States does not intend any hostile action toward North Korea but we're going to have to build trust in order to get them to a point where that conviction is reflected in their policies. I promise aid shorter term question, and that is the immediate question of how to get the North Korean delegation back to the table. There have been periods of on again/off-again diplomacy. Recently the North Korean leadership has suggested that negotiations may be tied in some fashion the to nature and extent of U.S. joint exercises with its South Korean military. What do you see as the key steps that the trump administration needs to take to encourage or incentivize the North Korean delegation to come back and talk? After all, as you said in your remarks, there is a sense in chts window of time available for seizing this opportunity is not infinite. Yes. So of course we have to be ready. We have to be prepared. And we have to convey to the North Koreans that we're prepared to have this discussion on all parties, both sides. We can and we have communicated that tom North Koreans. We've done it directly and indirectly. We have down it through third parties. We've I didn't publicly we've I didn't privately. The North Koreans know where we are. The North Koreans know what the opportunity is. The North Koreans have a decision to make on engagement. We're prepared to do so when they're ready. As I said a moment ago. And it's worth repeating, that we're ready, but North Korea has to make that choice too. I want to turn now to our excellent students Ryan and Zack and allow them to ask some of the questions that you all have posed. Ryan and Zack, if you could each introduce of your very briefly before you lead into the questions. We want to give everyone in the room a little illustration of what some of our students are working on related to the center. Thank you, professor. Thank you, sir, for being here us with us p I'm my name is Ryan am eye second year national public policy student. My focus for research has been on international security policy. The first question from the audience is to what extent has the trump administration withdrawn from the comprehensive plan of action with Iran impacted negotiations with North Korea? So the Iran nuclear corridor, the JCP JCPOA certainly is an issue that the North Korea answered would notice and it goes to an underpinning concern that they will certain have as to how any agreement we reach together will be durable. I'm not responsible for the JCPOA but I am undertaking the direction of the Secretary of State and the president diplomacy on that not entirely dissimilar set of issues and a not entirely dissimilar set of circumstances. But our answer, what's going to be different about our efforts with North Korea, is that we're trying to do much more than the JCPOA did. The JCP government, the Iran liewcialg agreement targeted very narrowly the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons programs and suspended for a period of time those programs in hopes that some other changes might occur in the external environment that would allow for the progress but also allow for fact that Iran could revert back to the full operation of its nuclear enrichment after the conclusion of that agreement. That agreement was also intentionally, the agreement intentionally excluded the broader set of issues in the U.S.-Iran relationship. And so what the United States saw in the aftermath of that agreement being reached was that the increased economic resources and the immediate gains that Iran made in some of the settlements that came Mel after the agreement provided them with resources that they chose to spend to further engage in the destabilization of many nations in region, including Yemen, Syria where they had an active combat presence undertaking brutal, brutal treatment of the Syrian people, and also to strengthen their hold on Lebanon through Hezbollah, and those eroded the environment in which progress might have been made with Iran, even with the tenuous nature of the nuclear agreement that had been reached in the temporary nature. In the case of North Korea, we answer that question in our engagement with the North Koreans because we're trying to do much more. We actually -- the president has committed to transforming our relationship with North Korea to bringing about a permanent peace regime to the Korean peninsula, to find areas of cooperation to move forward in this relationship at the same time that we're also addressing the compelling and dangerous threat of weapons of mass destruction. It's going to be hard. I don't for a second take lightly the mandate that the president has given us. The North Koreans are willing to do the same, we have a lot of potential to put together a very durable agreement between our two countries. And I'm also very honored to help welcome you back. My name is Zachary. I'm currently a fourth year undergraduate at the Ford school with a focus in diplomacy, and my first question to ask you is historically the North Korean problem is also a China problem. To what extent, in your. , have the tariffs, rhetoric and adversarial posture toward China affected negotiations. So a big country like ours and a big country like China are going to have a lot of interests around the world, and to simplify it, we have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. The economic issues that we're negotiating with China right now are very important issues. They aren't just important for the president. They're important to the economy and to the future economic security of the United States of America. And that is a very tough negotiation because we're trying to shift the direction of China's economy to try to convince them to shift the direction of their economy in a way that has been established over the course of the last two decades. We work very closely, China on North Korea, needless to say. China has the largest land order of any country in the world outside the demilitarized zone. Choon is going to be instrument instrumental in the cities success of international diplomacy with North Korea as we go forward. We have invested quite bit of a time in working with our Chinese counters parts. We have developed a close relationship. The Chinese in our SUV sent the right messages to North Korea at every Surin. And my Chinese counterpart told me when we first met several months ago is notwithstanding the other areas of tension in the U.S.-China relation, that China would compartmentalize North Korea and their cooperation on that. I told them that we would accept that until we had evidence to suggest otherwise, and we don't have any evidence to suggest otherwise. That's not as to say it's not,, of course, there are enormous tensions in hufs China relations. Not only do we have the economic issues that we're seeking to negotiate. We have various national security differences. We have differences over Taiwan. The student -- the street prophecies in Hong Kong have exacerbated tensions in the relationship even though we're not driving that, China is feeling besieged. There are many things China is doing in places like Shenzhen and other parts of of the south China sea that are add her ents to us and we've raised concerns about. So it's not easy. It's not easy to compartmentalize but we've been successful so far, and I'll tell you why. Because China is not doing -- China is not pursuing its policies in North Korea as a favor to United States of America. China's pursuing its own interests in North Korea. What I have told people before when asked this question is my assessment of China is they're 100% with us some of the way. [Laughter] China wants peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. China wants the elimination of weapons mass destruction on the Korean peninsula. There's a lot of thing we won't agree on. Our military alliance with the South Koreans, other things like that. But China for its own interests parallels our interests, and that's the basis for countries to work together. I'm a big fan of countries acting in their own interests and finding a way to work with other countries that share those interests. In the case of North Korea so far we've been able to do that pretty well with the Chinese. Let me follow up very quickly with that and ask you to expand on what you see as China's constructive roles with regard to North Korea. There are sanctions enforcement, political pressure. I'd love to hear a bit more on that. First, just the messaging that comes from the Chinese leader to the North Koreans for the need to engage in a intensive diplomatic process towards the achievement of a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. China is not shy about that. China voted for every UN security council resolution by definition because they can only pass with the unanimous vote of the permanent five members of the UN security council. China has given voice to the policies the same as us. We share our objectives and our strategy to a certain degree with the Chinese. They give us useful feedback about they have a lot of experience the in region. But, of course, above all in the maintaining the pressure on North Korea, as we search for a diplomatic solution there's no country that's more important than China. China is North Korea's largest trading partner. It shares a large land border and has territory territorial waters add Jay tent to North Korea. So China's role in that dimension of the critically important to the cities. Again, we meet regularly with the China's convoy. Many times. We just had a turnover in China of their representative on North Korea did -- lead rep Tift on North Korea. We are just in the beginning stages of building a relationship. But my counterpart over the past year has been a tremendous partner, and I'm looking forward developing the same modicum of cooperation with their new representative. Sir, given the centralized authority of North Korean regime, have you encountered difficulties when working with your counterparts in the North Korean diplomatic core having the initiative and leverage to negotiate on terms without seeking higher guidance? So in any system of government, ours included, there has to be some connection to the direction of the ultimate leadership. In our case with separate branches government, that includes me being attentive to the interests of Congress, but ultimately I serve at the pleasure of president, Secretary of State, so I need to know that what I'm doing is consistent with the president's decisions on these policies. If that's the case in our system, which is a democratic system in which we have divided branches government, multiple voices in the democratic debate, it's all the more so in the North Korean system which really is a centralized rule where chairman Kim Jong-un runs that country in every dimension. And as such, as the leader North Korea, it's incumbent upon him to create the space that his negotiators have in order to enter into an discussion with us, in order to enter into the kind of of give-and-take that's necessary to explore solutions of the very complicated issues like the ones we're working on now. But that's also why it was so important for us to change the trajectory of the diplomacy on the Korean peninsula with leader-to-leader engagement. Hopefully what President Trump can do with chairman skim give chairman Kim the confidence that if he opens that space to his team, that he will find it will be a fruitful diplomatic process that will allow us both to Chief Executive our goals as -- achieve our goals as laid out in the Singapore summit just a year ago. So it is a strictly controlled system. It's a rigid system. It is leader driven in its entirety. But that also is why we think that it's a very constructive step forward for the president to engage directly and try to create that diplomatic space for the people inside the system. As a leader-driven system, it's also been clear that despite how closed off it is, we've been able to see that North Korea is a major violater of human rights, so in this case and with your educational, what place does human rights play in this sort of U.S. policy? So the United States, of course, assigns high value to human rights around the world. We have historically. It's part of the core of who we are. This has been an issue of some tension and discussion between the United States and North Korea over many years. And it is and remains an issue of contention. The United States is not -- has not listen its voice through resolutions and international organizations, through corporation driven reporting process, and through the kind of designations that we undertake as the United States government not only to fulfill our ideals but to fulfill our laws. I should also be very clear that my negotiating priority is not human rights of North Korea. My negotiating priority starts with the elimination of the weapons of mass descrowcts Korean peninsula. It sentenced into transforming relations, it sentenced into creating more peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and to addressing some of the harder edges between our two societies that trace back all the way to the Korean war. In this process we open up space for discussions on a number of i that have divided the United States and North Korea over many, many years. We've got to start with the highest priority. We have to address all of our interests and ideals. And, of course, these negotiations and the United States needs to continue to give voice to I'm human rights around the world. . Sir, do you think that this potential lowered U.S. operational readiness on the screek, screek talks need to progress? The question from the audience is would that also be possible to decrease the overall footprint of the U.S. military in South Korea in exchange for total denuclearization. We're well away from that, but certainly in my speech when I talk about the U.S. military presence can move away from being a state -- being in a state of preparedness and training for perpetual war to playing a constructive and stabilizing role towards a durable peace, it includes a lot of strategic reconsiderations that might be available to us as we make progress in all the issues I laid out. Again, we're a long way away from there. And I think we have to start with the objective of solving the problem, lowering the threat, lowering the risk. Then we need to leave to it our military leaders to may be make a sober judgment on the level of risk and the appropriate response the United States has an an allied partner of South Korea. But, of course, the forces are driven by the perception of threat. If we can address the threat, we give ourselves a lot more options. Going back to China, you spoke about forging ties with North Korea. Now, in your opinion, would China permit a border nation that they support to grow closer with the U.S.? And if so, how much closer, in your opinion? So I say China is 100% with us some of the way. [Laughter] Not that far. That is not the way. We and China, we have a lot of issues, the miedz and China need to sort out as China rises and as we try to find a set of global norms that both of our nations are willing and able to support and abide by that will produce an opportunity for our peoples, our respective peoples to thrive. We're not there yet. That underlies a lot of the issues that Jenn theme underlies a lot of the issues and tension with China and those you are unresolved. Of course, China not welcome a U.S. military ally on its border, and the Chinese have said as much in the past. But that's not our goal, either. So this isn't going to be a major point of contention. I think it's fair to say that the Chinese would judge that a stable and peaceful relationship between the United States and North Korea has attend benefits for the people's republic of China. I laid out some of the security benefit duty also the economic benefits a moment ago. The domestic benefits for that Ranger enormous. This part of China that neighbors the Korean peninsula is among the poorest areas of the people's republic of China. It's an industrial area, heavy industries that historically have been something of the industrial driver of China, but like so many of our industrial cities here in the midwest, time has taken its toll and an infusion of cross-board trade and economic invention would be hugely beneficial. The same for Russia. One of the most economically challenged of the Russian federation is the far east. Population is in declain client. Opening frayed and opportunity for that part of Russia would likewise be hugely beneficial. I talked about the opportunities for -- I've talked about today about the opportunities for South Korea as well that would evolve from that. You have to think about South Korea as an island. South Korea is one of the largest trading nations in the world, but there's not a single good that comes into or out of South Korea that isn't on a ship or an airplane. There's no land drops. South Korea is isolated from the rest of Asia by North Korea. Imagine the benefits that could come from an infrastructure that would be built across the Korean peninsula tying all of these economically challenged areas together along with infusions of international investment, international trade, the United States would engage economically. It's not -- it's a great outcome. But we have a lot of work to do to get there. And it's -- it is a lot of work, and it's going to take us some time to get to that point, and the North Koreans are going to have to decide on what terms they want to enter that world, if that's the choice that they make, and we hope it is. All of this is premised upon also addressing the national security risk, and as an American diplomat I have to keep coming back to the central interests of the United States of America, which is to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula. None of this vision is going to really come to fruition if we can't make progress on that, but we have to convince the North Koreans is the benefit of that, is the future for North Korea for North Korea. That's what we're trying to do here. During your speech you talked about how the potential forral fail could result in increase proceed lifer as a in the regional if North Korea has able to develop and maintain a successful nuclear arsenal. The question is has the administration's calls for an increased burden sharing or at least that perception among allies, cast out on the long term U.S. extended deterrence policy, and does that have implications for long-term cooperation. We're not there yet and I don't expect we will get there. We will work closely with our allies to try to find a balanced solution to address usuals of burden sharing that have plagued the United States with its alliance partners around the world since World War II. The burden-sharing debate didn't begin in 2017 when President Trump took office office. I cut my teeth in Washington on European affairs for almost 15 years before I took on this portfolio. And I can tell you that the issue of defense spending in Europe has been a plague on the U.S. alliance with NATO practically since its very founding. And it's just an objective fact that in many cases the allies don't even meet the minimal commitment in defense spending that they committed to achieve in order to make those alliances real. The worst thing in the world for us would be to have an alliance relationship with a country in which we were tied to their national defense but they didn't take adequate steps themselves to defend themselves. And so what we want to see from all of our alliance partners is a full commitment in that regard. Certainly, a modicum of stability on the proliferation front does come from confidence in the extended deterrence. But that extended deterrence can be brought into question for reasons on hern the failure of thal lions. NATO was still a viable institution in the 1980s when the Soviet Union began to deploy new missile systems that were designed specifically to sever security ties between the United States and Europe. The Soviet Union sought in the 1980s to create a scenario in which one or the other might choose to sit it out in the case of a war because it really wasn't their business, what was going on, and they didn't want to take the hit if they stuck their nose into it. President Reagan, work can with many of our European allies, president mitt rafned France, chancellor Cole of Germany, prime minister that Cher in Britain, made a very controversial decision to employ the Persian 2 missile, deploy the euro missiles into Europe to signal the U.S. security against the face of external threat. These are the kind of debates that we put behind us at the end of the cold war. We were able to move into a much more optimistic posture ash the world, but we have seen the rise of new missile systems in other parts of the world, and we've also seen development new capabilities like those in North Korea with its weapons of mass destruction. Any foreign policy, any national security expert will tell you that this creates stresses on the strategic choices that every country in the region makes. And that's to everybody's detriment. We do not want more nuclear weapon states in the world, full stop. China doesn't, either. Russia doesn't want it, either. So we have to work together even with countries like China Russia. We have other areas of disagreement to sustain also this 50-year commitment of non-proliferation that arose out of non-proliferation treaty. Each time we confront a breach in that, we face the possibility of a dam burst, and so it's very much in our interests to cooperate and succeed not just on the denuclearization of North Korea North Korea but in the broader sense in the full sets of transformational steps that I described. I feel like you guys are asking me these questions. I know they're coming from all of you. But these are great questions, and thank you much, very much for them. These are all questions that we really are wrestling this. These are Reagan realtime. You should know that these questions you're asking are the same ones that are asked nide is halls of government eye daily basis, and we have to have answers to these because these are the stakes. So thank you. Please go ahead. Let me undertake to say that we have dozens of questions here. [Laughter] And we don't have time to -- for to you answer them, but we'll undertake to at least send you the questions so that you have a sense of the audience and the sense of what our students are thinking and others in the audience. We don't expect an answer, but just to give you a sense of the rest of the audience because we're never going to get to all the questions. [Laughter] Anyway here comes the next question. Perfect. Given the U.S. decision to pull out of the JCPOA agreement and with the president calling it a one-sided transaction, at the same time President Trump announced a decision to remove additional sanctions from North Korea despite having violated UN security resolution -- violated UN security resolution and having conducted recent little before ballistic missile tests. How would you explain the source of disparate in foreign policy with the approach between Iran and between North Korea? So just a slight correction. I don't know if the transcription or a mistake in perception. We have not lifted any sanctions against North Korea at palm in fact, the sanctions of North Korea by the United Nations secure council are comprehensive. But this comes back to the issue of the JCP oovment which is the larger issue -- and it is to some degree the question answered a moment ago. Let me just say that we're going to have to do things differently. The mandate that I have and the mandate that the international community has agreed to in the UN security council resolutions dating back to 2:00 is the 2:00 2006 is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It's not the sus tension of uranium to test if and see if other elements in the relationship with change. What we're trying to do with this diplomacy is transform the relations with North Korea in a way that also shifts incentives. When a country doesn't feel like it's at risk from invasion or a threat or hostile policies week can we work together with them to also address dangerous technologies like weapons of mass destruction that ironically are also the source of that risk and that hostility. We've got a lot of work to do with our counterparts in North Korea to test and see if this is possible. But what we're trying to do is much bigger than the JCPOA represented with Iran, and it's probably, not to foreshadow too much what my colleagues, it's probably very much the nature where we go with Iran if engagement does, in fact, begin between us and the Iranians. If I could, I'd like to interject a question to make sure we address a little bit of what's happening in Washington and what's different about this administration. You've got a lot of experience with the George h W. and George W. Bush administrations. You were serving in Congressional roles throughout the Clinton years, certainly following and intimately familiar with the Obama administration. Each president is unique but this one is obviously so in om respects. And I want you, if you would, to tell as a little bit about how that empowers you in diplomacy and what are some ways in which it causes you to have to adjust to the way in which you conduct diplomacy. Thank you. In the case of North Korea, it probably offers some significant examples, to answer your question, because the president is personally invested in this policy. President Trump very much feels ownership of the course of our diplomacy in North Korea. And he has personally given direction to me and to my team and to the secretary of state on where he wants to go and what he wants to do with this. As an aside, I am a public servant. I serve at the pleasure of the president and Secretary of State. But I also have to think he's right. I think what he's trying to do here is long overdue and I think there's a chance that we can do it. And so that's also motivating, is when you are fully engaged with support of the policies, professionals in government work on all sorts of policies that they don't always agree on. I have the great opportunity to be right on the issue in the place I believe. Now, the advantages that have come from that, of course, the president in our system has cleared the space. The will the has given direction on what he wants done. That helps a lot. We have a big and sprawling government with a variety of views, well-informed views and well-substantiated scepticism or concern about various elements of policy, but when the president has provided the direction, that's kind of empowering, to Zais the least. The -- say the least. The president has consistently messaged to chairman Kim Jong-un his commitment to do this in a way that, as I described earlier, in our view is important to opening up and changing the direction in North Korea to meet us and to achieve these goals. Very important that's very important. Every time the president tweets, our counterparts in North Korea read it carefully. They study it closely. And the president has been consistent in his messaging about diplomatic opportunity. Some challenges do arise from this as well. We have -- it's no secret that it's been challenging to get the North Koreans to engage at the working level and do the real daltd negotiations that are going to be necessary to bring to life, to bring to reality the vision that the two leaders have laid out. They're going to have to work with us. These are complicated issues that that require enormous expertise and thoughtful, thoughtful exchange in order to realize solutions that are acceptable to both sides. It has to happen. And that's my message to you today is we've got to get this going. It's time for us to get started. The North Koreans, not surprisingly, have wanted to talk to the president, and so the Hanoi summit was an opportunity where the North Korean side brought their ideas directly to the president's meetings, and unfortunately it illustrated the challenges of reach an agreement. We were unable to reach an agreement. We haven't done the work necessary to really test these ideas and get sufficient feedback on ha was viable and what wasn't. The process isn't going to work unless it's got both the top and the bottom. The challenge, of course, is when the president is so directly associated with it, he's going to own that as well. It works. With the totality of circumstances that we have, it works. We have space for diplomacy. We still have time to be able to resolve these issues. And I'm confident we can do it. But I think it's quite clear in both my remarks and in my answer here, John, we've got to get going. . You discussed the good working relationship that you have with your counterparts in Russia and China, and the question from the audience is how does the isolation of the North Korean diplomatic personnel working on the negotiations impact the process and are there any -- that you can elaborate on? I know you didn't ask the question, but let me address it more generally. So North Korea has a ministry of foreign affairs. It has very skilled diplomats p it's got seasoned negotiators who have worked with the United States on these issues for 25 years. In fact, some of the very people that we're working with today in a more junior capacity were involved in the first iteration of these negotiations in the early 1990s. Framework negotiations they were called back then. And so North Korea has a set of skilled and experienced diplomats. North Korea has embassies around the world. They don't have an embassy here in the United States of America but they do have a permanent representation, but the United Nations and New York, they have diplomats who live abroad, who work abroad, and they interact with many countries around the world on a daily basis. North Korea has a number of -- the North Korean government has a number of relationships historically that have been closer, including China, including Russia, including some of the other countries with whom it was in common cause during cold war. So Poland and the Czech Republic and Bulgaria and these countries still to this day have embassies in Pyongyang as, incidentally, do the Germans, the British, the French. Well, the French have a diplomatic representation and the Swedes and many other countries. So North Korea is definitely an insular government and it's very difficult for us to communicate directly with and speedily. But but I think both sides know each other very well and I and I know weave a lot of experience working together and there's a lot of work we can do together . More of a personal question. As a former we Wolverine what advice would you give to a current student to achieve a career in foreign policy such as yours? You already made the first important decision. [Laughter] Being at a University of Michigan student. And I will say this, in all seriousness, having on my resume at a young age University of Michigan was a helpful and impressive credential, even when I had no experience in anything else. I can only tell you how I did it, for whoever is asking me that question, and there's no one way you can do it. But what I -- over the course of the years I had the opportunity to work very closely with the university in other capacities. For many years I was a board member of the Michigan and Washington program, which is the university's semester in Washington program where a cohort of 25 to 30 students will to ... full semester coursework while interning, working in the institutional government, none of profit NGO, in Washington, DC. For those of you who might be interested in a career in waisht highly recommend that program you can still carry a full class load and you can have a very interesting career experience that opens doors for you later. So I'm no longer on the board of that. I had to resign when I took this position. But the professor from the political science department now leads that program. We have a -- the university has a permanent team in Washington, DC. So that's an option. But I mentor, all of us who are on the board mentored Michigan students who came through and gave them career advice. My number one piece of career advice for any student who is getting ready to purchase sigh career in Washington is move to Washington. You can't phone it in. There is a land of constant opportunity. Jobs are opening and jobs are being filled on a constant basis, but being there is half of it. You have to take a chance. But chances are if you're a student at this university, you have a friend or a former roommate or a classmate who has got an apartment, who has got an open couch. You can get out there and you can knock on doors. Second is ask people for help. All of us, myself included, somebody helped give us a leg up in our careers. When I went out to Washington, DC, I knocked on doors, some people were kind enough to sit down, spend a little bit of time with me, and they did it because there's a lot of interest in helping young people and it's a great spirit in Washington but they also did it in many cases because that's what someone did for them when they got their start. And so they're willing to do it as I'm willing to do it, as I have done over many, many years with other students as well but with a particular bias towards University of Michigan students. . I guess that's how I got my start. I started out on Capitol Hill. And I know the Congress is the subject of a lot of derision. I know that the political stalemate and the caustic nature of our politics takes some of the shine off of it. It is a great place to start your career. You will find that you can match up with a member of Congress or senator whose policies you support, whose issues you can be passionate about, and it's a great upwardly mobile place. Virtually everyone who starts here I don't know care what your degree, everyone starts as a staff assistant, a phone answerer, a secretary, but the advancement is fast because there's constant turnover as young people are moving to other jobs, other opportunities, grad school and oh on. It was a great place for me to start and that worked for me. But there's other great ways to start your job. Of course, the sphorn service exam for those of you who are interested in international relations, take the foreign service exam. It's the doorway into our professional diplomatic core. And by the way, it's a start to a tremendous career opportunity, particularly for young people to see a lot of the world and to work on behalf of their country. So I commend that to you as well. I'm not going to go on too much more with that, but you have a lot of great reseizures sources in the university -- resources in the university. My search started at the career planning office. I looked at the public service internship program. We didn't have the Michigan in Washington seminar program when I was a student here, but it's a tremendous resource for the student body now. You have a lot of options. Just have to go out and find them. . Sir, given the public nature of the ongoing negotiations and difficult problems, implications across the U.S. interagency team, can you expand on your role, especially unique role how it interacts with its national security experts broader U.S. government. The national security council plays a hugely important role in this, in any foreign policy issue. It is the location where all the views of the agencies are consolidated and synthesize into what want you hopes is a coherent policy, and so we have a process inside the national security council that I attend on behalf of the department of state at times usually with the deputy Secretary of State. For those of you who are a little bit more informed of the ways of Washington, you know that the MSC actually is a stratified organization. It has the principles, which is a national security adviser, the Secretary of State, secretary defense, CIA director. It's got to departments which are the number 2ness each of those agencies and it's got a whole set of foreign policy professionals in different rairchtionz assistant scerts, deputy assistant secretaries, et cetera. So it's a layer dollars process and ultimately at the top is the national security council, and really the national security council is not the MSC staff. National security council is the president of the United States with his or her national security team surrounding them to discuss issues. So that process brings all those views from all those agencies in, and my issue, the issue I work on cuts cross eye lot of parts of of the federal government. North Korea touches on economics and trade and sanctions, treasury department, Congress department are deeply involved in North Korea policy. Of course the Department of Defense, all of the attendant issues related to nation security. If presence of U.S. troops the in Korean peninsula to our deterrent on the Korean peninsula. We have a lot of parts of the department of state hav to come to the table through our deputy secretary John Sullivan or myself at these meetings. Then, of course, you of the NFC staff which is comprised of a lot of professionals. Not surprisingly, there are differences views. There People have different responsibilities. They have different experiences. They have different points of view. And the goal of the NFC is to coherently forge that into a set of policies that can be recommended to the president of the United States. On its a push and a pull. I talked about my issue and the issue I've been asked to serve, North Korea, as one that has a lot of push because the president has set out what he wants food. What we're trying to do is how to succeed in the plam terrace of the president how they play out for North Korean policy. . Of This can be consent shus. It has been across administrations. You have people here in this room with me who, like me, have served at these levels of government and have participated in that process. Obviously, it should be easy. These are heady issues. These are important issues. We want to hear a wide set of points of view. I think it serves the president, serves the country to have those all vetted. And our North Korea policy, I think we have a strong policy and I think we're serving the president very well. Now, given the timing of the -- of the Vietnam summit and considering the fact that not long afterwards North Korea began to test more short-range missiles, what effect have those actions by the North Koreans had on our most recent educational with them? -- our most recent educational dealings with them? So our view is that the most important thing we can do in North Korea is to set aside any vestiges of hostel behavior and engage in the kind of diplomacy that's going to be necessary to build a stronger understanding and a address the full range of the threats and risk on the Korean panes law. We peninsula. In recent weeks and recent months there has been a lot of talk about short range ballistic missiles by a of the North Korean test, but this is against a backdrop of a system that's also tested intermediate range ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, that is clearly in possession of nuclear ceaps with the demonstrated testing that has been done a couple of years ago, that's been reaching nuclear materials in order to -- raw material in order to build weapons. And also it's widely reported to have chemical and biological weapons programs. So the threat is there. The risk is there. The challenge is to find a way through diplomacy to resolve it. And the president has made clear that the short range ballistic missiles don't make him heap but it's not going to disrupt our efforts in order to engage diplomacy to resolve the very issues that we're referring to. So these are the kind of of things, though, that also challenge the diplomatic space we have in which we have to operate weeks expo there's a, and so there's a whole set of circumstances we have to manage bilaterally, at home, domestically in the interaction with our corporation, with our press, with our expert community in national security. It's a surprise maintain, and -- [Laughter] -- and we're just going to do our very best to work with it help? This is the last question from the audience. As you seek and the administration seeks transformational change between the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea, if you could just speak or expand on the importance of verification monitoring and what steps are being taken in the process to ensure that actions are enforceable in the final agreement. We haven't gotten to a point in negotiations where we have discussed in detail an agreement on verification measures. But suffice it to say, meaningful and verifiable steps are going to be necessary for us to be convince that had we have made the progress that we need to make on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It's not going to be easy. Again, it's going to be another issue that's going to be challenging for us to resolve. But there's an absolute international consensus, including our partners in China and Russia that verification has to be part of any meaningful steps on denuclearization. We're going to have to work to figure out how to do that. That's something that's going to be an important part of our negotiation, but we don't have an agreement yet that would lead me to the confidence to say that we can do that. So just a question about process, which is often very important for foreign policy. Could you talk a little bit about your team. You've mentioned your team. Who are they? And how do you -- what do you do day by day? What's sort of the pace of work when you're dealing with an issue like this, which is very tight and focused? Let me take this as an opportunity to give credit where credit's due. The president has obviously entrusted and the Secretary of State has entrusted in me an important priority in U.S. national security, but I could not do this with without a team of professionals working with me both inside my organization, inside the department of state, but also we have a second team. We really have two teams. The second one is our negotiating team. On the first inside the department of state you have a mixed of foreign service officers of civil service experts in their field and also some people who came from outside, political appointees in the department, and they work tirelessly. There's a tremendous, tremendously talented, motivated group of people, many of them young, and the hours they work and the commitment they make and the rewards, financial rewards compared to my experience in the private sector, it's just intimidating to see, really tremendous talents. We get -- don't ever lose faith in your government. We get the best and the brightest and we have a bunch of them, and I'm fortunate to have them on my team working on this issue on behalf you all, on behalf of our secretary and our president, on behalf of our people. We have a negotiating team that we brought onboard. We have saw the to draw from the best resources across the government. So we have the best gliewpt United States government. We have the chief scientist of the department of energy and the University of Michigan graduate, I found out. I have two Ohio state Buckeyes on my team. [Laughter] Who are tremendous, incidentally. We have representatives at the department of treasure. We have representatives at the Department of Defense. And we brought all this to bear in our discussions with the North Koreans. We invited them to engage us with the same level of expertise in the same breath, and to date I can tell you one of the frustrations has been that the North Koreans have not brought the same level of expertise to the table, and as a consequence we know a lot more about some of the things that we're negotiating with that are in their country than they have known at the table, and that makes it challenging too. But it's always an honor to serve our country, and I am deeply grateful to the president and the Secretary of State for giving me this opportunity. For me, it's a return to government. For those men and women who are tirelessly working every day, my hat's off to them. It is a great great team. This is wonderful and we greatly appreciate you sharing all of these insights. I particularly appreciate the fact that you have discussed a whole number of different levels or are forums in which diplomacy occurs. It occurs working with your team in a complex interagency process in a set of relationships with alloys, ultimately also, of course, with the nowshans North Koreans. In a moment I'll ask the audience to join me in thanking you. First I want to thank the Weitzer family again for making possible for the Ford school to welcome leaders in the practice of foreign affairs to come to campus and share insights that we are sure are very helpful to those of you who are interested until the topic or those of you who plan to be practitioners yourselves. The second is to draw your attention again, as Dean Michael said at the outset, to the array of activity we have coming this fall and beyond. We have a simple website to remember, diplomacyUmichigan.edu. Come visit us in Weill hall. Come is on see many of the other interesting events we have from public forums to student-focused simulations and workshops and a whole array of other opportunities that the Weiser diplomacy center is able to make available for the University have Michigan community. And so in a moment we'll start a reception across the hall, but before we head over there, can you please Ontario me in thanking Steve bieng for being here. [Applause]